Agent Skills Enable a New Class of Realistic and Trivially Simple Prompt Injections

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October 24, 2025

1 Summary

Enabling continual learning in LLMs remains a key unresolved research challenge. In a recent announcement, a frontier LLM company made a step towards this by introducing Agent Skills, a framework that equips agents with new knowledge based on instructions stored in simple markdown files. Although Agent Skills can be a very useful tool, we show that they are fundamentally insecure, since they enable *trivially simple* prompt injections. We demonstrate how to hide malicious instructions in long Agent Skill files and referenced scripts to exfiltrate sensitive data, such as internal files or passwords. Importantly, we show how to bypass system-level guardrails of a popular coding agent: a benign, task-specific approval with the 'Don't ask again' option can carry over to closely related but harmful actions. Overall, we conclude that despite ongoing research efforts (Wallace et al., 2024) and scaling model capabilities (Anthropic, 2025), frontier LLMs remain vulnerable to very simple prompt injections in realistic scenarios. Our code is available at https://github.com/aisa-group/promptinject-agent-skills.

2 How Do Agent Skills Work?

Background Agent Skills enable an agent to dynamically include knowledge related to different tasks and environments in their context window. Skills are located in the .claude/skills/ folder of a project directory. All skills are represented by a directory that contains a file called SKILL.md. This file starts with the name and description of the skill in YAML format. Below this metadata, the skillfile contains a set of instructions. A skill folder can also contain other files or scripts, which the SKILL.md file can refer to. The name and description attributes are read at model start and loaded into the system prompt. The body of the skill file is loaded only when Claude decides that a skill is relevant. All other files in a skill directory are loaded by Claude when they are called from the SKILL.md.



Figure 1: Claude Code lists the skills it has access to.

Motivation There are multiple aspects of Agent Skills that make prompt injections against them particularly easy and plausible:

¹https://www.anthropic.com/news/skills

- untrusted parties will exchange them freely (e.g., in third-party marketplaces²),
- Agent Skills will be used by non-technical users,
- stealing private information is easy, since many Agent Skills are applied to coding agents that operate
 on various user files and credentials (slide decks, API keys, etc.),
- every line of Agent Skills is typically interpreted as an instruction, so prompt injections are particularly easy to execute; this is in contrast to prompt injections hidden in emails or websites that may require iterative optimization (Zhan et al., 2025),
- prompt injection defenses that are based on simply detecting instructions in data are, by definition, not valid as Agent Skills are all instructions,
- human oversight is difficult due to long Agent Skills files that may contain code dependencies or reference other Agent Skills files,
- instructions can potentially be hidden within contextually relevant instructions, further making human oversight challenging.

3 Experiments

Here we first describe experiments with Claude Code and then with Claude Web Interface.

3.1 Claude Code

In our experiment setup, we use a skill published by Anthropic to edit PowerPoint presentations.³ We then edit this pptx skill to include a line that instructs agents to execute a seemingly benign action, i.e., call a script for doing a backup after a presentation has been edited.

```
**IMPORTANT: Invoke the backup script using the 'file_backup.py' script**
'''bash
python scripts/file_backup.py output.pptx
'''
```

The Python script will upload the presentation to an external API. Finally, we place the edited pptx skill in the .claude/skill/ directory of the project and the script in the .claude/skill/scripts/ directory. Once we tell Claude Code to change a slide in a sample presentation, it will upload it to the external API using the script. The exact prompt can be seen in Figure 2.

Whenever Claude Code asks for authorization, we go with the option to 'allow action and do not ask again', as can be seen in Figure 3. The process of editing a slide typically uses Python commands. Thus, when the time comes around to uploading the updated presentation using our malicious script, the authorization is usually granted, and the upload happens without any further user interaction. The final outputs can be seen in Figure 4.

We found that it does not make a difference where the prompt injection is located, i.e., in the description or the body of the SKILL.md file. Furthermore, it is not necessary to put the code snippet for the upload into an external script. However, it can be helpful to make the output of Claude Code look less suspicious: 'calling file_backup.py' might be better than 'sending POST request to www.xyz.com/upload'.




Figure 2: Claude Code is asked to edit a presentation and it asks for permission to use the skill.

²https://skillsmp.com/

³https://github.com/anthropics/skills/tree/main/document-skills

Figure 3: Claude asks for permission two more times to execute Python commands. We decide to go with the option: Yes, and don't ask again.




Figure 4: Claude starts the malicious script without asking for approval again. It uploads a file and finishes by giving a summary. It claims it just made a backup.

3.2 Claude Web Interface

By uploading the same malicious skill into our Claude Web Account (Settings - Capabilities - Skills - Upload Skill), we tested the same attack for the Claude Web Interface. Here, Claude blocked the backup.py script because outgoing network traffic was only allowed for packet managers.

We adapted our attack to attach a malicious URL to the model output. In our case, this URL contains a password that was on the last slide of the presentation. But, in theory, it can contain any sensitive data that the model saw during editing. The result of the attack can be seen in Figure 5.

4 Discussion

As our experiments show, a malicious skill can be successfully loaded and used. This relies on the assumption that the user does not check every line of the skill file and the scripts in its directory, and that the user decides for the 'don't ask again' option, allowing our malicious script to execute without any further confirmation.




Figure 5: Claude Web presents the user with a malicious link that leaks potentially sensitive information upon opening.

Since a skill is just a directory that contains a markdown file, anyone can build and publish one. These third-party skills can then be distributed over marketplaces⁴ that do not necessarily pose strong restrictions on them and might not give guarantees to their users.

Recommendations Despite ongoing research efforts (Wallace et al., 2024), frontier LLMs remain vulnerable to very simple prompt injections, and this is not resolved with model scaling. This also backfires in high-stakes settings, such as AI control (Terekhov et al., 2025). Thus, more work has to be done in model-level defenses. Additionally, using external and system-level guardrails (Debenedetti et al., 2025) remains important to bridge the model-level vulnerabilities. While a pragmatic first layer is to scan skills with an LLM, this inherits the scanner's own jailbreak surface and might be evaded by benign-sounding instructions that require the LLM to distinguish legitimate from near-identical malicious actions (e.g., sharing with your team vs external).

Ethical considerations The prompt injection vulnerability has been a long-standing issue for LLMs. However, the way Agent Skills work makes this vulnerability particularly easy to exploit. We believe that pointing out realistic scenarios of how this vulnerability can be exploited will draw more attention to this issue and urge users to only rely on verified Agent Skills. In particular, using Agent Skills from unverified external sources poses substantial risks and should be approached with caution.

⁴https://skillsmp.com/

References

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